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"I care more for the independence and manliness of the American citizen 
than for all the gold or silver in the world," declared the Progressive governor of 
Michigan in 1899.1 Hazen Pingree thus concluded a speech denouncing the trusts, 
those huge corporations that seemed to be swallowing up individual enterprises 
at the turn-of-the-century. Indeed, Governor Pingree believed that those corpo-
rations were undermining the foundation of American manhood, and, in order to 
restore manliness, he was willing to sacrifice the greater wealth that giant 
enterprises might create. This essay returns to the Progressive-era debate over 
trusts and argues that, as Pingree's speech suggested, that debate was in part an 
argument over the shape that white manhood should take in the twentieth-century 
United States. 
Historians often set responses to corporations at the heart of Progressivism, 
that early twentieth-century hodgepodge of "shifting coalitions" which ulti-
mately produced such a range of reforms as Prohibition and women's suffrage, 
a graduated income tax and mothers' pensions, workmen's compensation and the 
direct election of senators.2 Richard Hofstadter, for instance, insisted that "big 
business was the ultimate enemy of the Progressive."3 In most analyses, this turn-
of-the-century concern has been construed as an anxiety about how to preserve 
local autonomy, a competitive economic system with a fairly equal distribution 
of wealth, and ultimately a representative political system. Large corporations, 
according to many Progressives and their historians, swallowed up smaller 
enterprises, robbing men of the economic independence on which democracy 
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itself depended.4 Other commentators both then and later also showed that 
organized capital corrupted the political process by buying off legislators and in 
that way, too, threatened representative government.5 "The life of the Trusts or the 
life of the republic—which?" This was America's stark choice according to 
muckraking journalist Charles Edward Russell.6 
Although perhaps no issue in United States history would seem mustier than 
Progressive-era trustbusting, I have revisited many of the speeches, editorials, 
books, and essays produced by the furor over big business and discovered two 
new and related aspects of it. The first is the degree to which the trust question was, 
in the early twentieth-century, a race and gender specific issue. My research 
suggests that the debate occurred almost exclusively within the community of 
white men. Black Progressives—men and women—and white women activists, 
volubly discussing other problems of the day, largely ignored this issue. Second, 
for at least some of the white men who participated in the struggle over the proper 
response to large corporations, the debate embodied a contest over the meaning 
of white manhood. This is not to argue that many other issues were not also at 
stake in the debate over corporations. Rather, this essay seeks simply to 
illuminate a previously undetected dimension of the controversy: for some, this 
debate was partly a battle over gender identities. For many of these men, of 
course, gender—or the particular shape that manhood would take—was integral 
to the fate of democracy. As Governor Pingree insisted: "A democratic republic 
cannot survive the disappearance of a democratic population," by which he meant 
"our independent and intelligent business men and artisans... ."7 
Pingree's belief that particular forms of manhood were integral to particular 
forms of government coincides with the current claim that gender has always been 
a constitutive element of institutions.8 Building on that insight, recent historians 
of the Progressive era have gone a long way toward understanding how gender 
(modified by ranee and class) structured political cultures and legislative agen-
das. We have come to see, for instance, that women and men reformers often had 
different public values and employed different strategies for effecting change and 
that only by understanding the interplay of these gendered political cultures can 
we fully comprehend Progressive reform.9 We have also begun to understand the 
ways that notions about proper manhood and womanhood shaped policies like 
mothers' pensions and workmen's compensation.10 This essay carries the same 
project into a more unlikely area of Progressive agitation: the debate over the 
shape of economic institutions. It shows that gender structured even the debate 
over "trusts." 
At the turn of the century, Americans staked out a variety of positions with 
regard to the emergence of huge corporate enterprises, often lumped together 
under the name "trusts." While conservatives believed that businesses should be 
left alone to grow as big as markets allowed them to, progressive reformers 
believed that the federal government should intervene. But reformers did not 
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agree on the goal of intervention. Some believed that the federal government 
should break up corporate combinations. "I favor complete and prompt annihi-
lation of the trust," Pingree baldly put it.11 Others insisted that the trusts were here 
to stay and that the federal obligation was to regulate them in the interest of 
workers and consumers. Representing this position, progressive mayor of To-
ledo, Samuel Jones, insisted: "our problem is not how to destroy them, but how 
to use them for the good of all."12 Others, like Theodore Roosevelt during his 
presidency (1901-1909), supported both trustbusting and regulation as they came 
to believe that some trusts were good and others bad. Bad trusts had to be busted; 
good trusts had to be regulated to make sure that they honestly served the public.13 
TRUSTBUSTERS 
Trustbusters, those who advocated breaking up big businesses, believed that 
large corporations threatened free enterprise and representative government; they 
also sometimes argued explicitly that enormous corporations were destroying 
American manhood. According to those like Hazen Pingree, this destruction 
occurred because corporate combinations snatched away the possibility of 
economic independence, which these commentators construed as the most 
significant foundation of American manhood. 
This perception was laid out in some detail, for instance, in a 1902 editorial 
in the weekly news magazine, the Independent.14 Because of trusts like Standard 
Oil and U.S. Steel, the editor argued, "there are left to-day few opportunities for 
the man who would prefer economic independence to a life of service as a salaried 
employee." During the nineteenth century, he insisted, young men sought the 
economic independence offered by ownership of their own businesses, but, in the 
present day, corporate capitalism was reducing such aspiring businessmen to 
"industrial dependents, receiving fixed salaries and liable to dismissal without 
warning "I5 The editor augured that if businesses continued to combine in ever 
larger corporate entities, then 
Every man who is not a multimillionaire will be a millionaire's 
man, dependent upon the good will of a superior for his daily 
bread. Could there be a more melancholy outcome of our great 
American attempt to build up a civilization in which every man 
might be independent and self-respecting?16 
Within corporations, in other words, all employees were analogous to servants; 
they could not achieve the independence of mind and action that this writer 
believed had previously characterized white American men. "As the number of 
economic dependents increases," the author worried, "Where will independent 
manhood be?nl 
Although such commentators exaggerated the degree to which their nine-
teenth-century predecessors actually achieved and maintained economic inde-
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pendence, their ideas about the past embodied cultural meanings well established 
in the nineteenth century. A generation of historians have gathered evidence 
showing that Americans who wielded cultural and political power in the mid-
nineteenth century associated "dependence" with women and black men, and 
"independence" with white men only. In fact, recent studies suggest that depen-
dence became more exclusively associated with women in the nineteenth-century 
United States than it had been ever before. In early modern Europe, independence 
was ascribed only to the few men who owned property. "Dependence" had 
marked not only women but also the majority of men, who were peasants or 
retainers laboring on someone else's land or in someone else's household. Only 
in the late eighteenth-century United States, with its relatively widespread 
landownership and a political commitment to "independence" for all white men, 
did property ownership (usually ownership of a farm or business) become 
accepted as the norm for white men and thus a basis of white manhood itself.18 
The emergence of industrial capitalism complicated this construction of 
white manhood. It began to create a working class in which few men could, even 
in the nineteenth century, hope to own a farm or business, the quintessential 
foundation of manly independence. As the pre-industrial organization of labor 
gave way to industrial production, journeymen in transformed industries lost 
hope of ever owning their own shop. They became permanent wage-earners in 
someone else's business.19 Even so, because independence had become so crucial 
to white manhood itself, these workers refused to see themselves outside the 
realm of "independent" men. In order to satisfy the cultural imperative that real 
men be "independent," these workers, according to analysts Linda Gordon and 
Nancy Fraser, began to insist that "independence" rested less on property 
ownership than on earning a family wage, that is, on supporting a dependent wife 
and children.20 
Thus, by the time of the trustbusting debate, "independence" was culturally 
connected with manhood for both working- and middle-class white men. For 
middle-class white men, this manly independence rested especially on ownership 
of a farm or business. For working-class white men, it rested especially on 
earning a family wage. 
In addition to these cultural ideals, trustbusters were responding to material 
circumstances that dominated American life at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Economic changes did indeed seem to be luring increasing numbers of 
men away from the kind of economic independence that early twentieth-century 
commentators believed American men had enjoyed earlier in the nineteenth 
century. According to historian Naomi Lamoreaux, for instance, "more than 
1800 firms disappeared into consolidations" between 1895 and 1904. Nell Irvin 
Painter put it another way: between 1897 and 1904 "one-third of all companies 
disappeared through mergers."21 Furthermore, farm owners accounted for a 
smaller and smaller proportion of gainfully employed Americans between 1900 
and 1930.22 In contrast, positions for salaried professionals, managers and clerks 
multiplied rapidly. This "new middle-class" of salaried employees constituted 
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the fastest growing sector of the labor market at the turn of the century, and, by 
1910, the people in this new middle class actually outnumbered independent 
businessmen and professionals by 5,609,000 to 3,261,000.23 
These numbers did not, of course, signal the disappearance of small business 
or demonstrate that men in large corporations did not enjoy any independence. 
Statistics show the contrary: that the absolute number of small firms actually 
increased in the 1890s and during the two subsequent decades as well.24 Espe-
cially in sectors of the economy not dominated by capital-intensive mass 
production, smaller enterprises continued to rule the day.25 Moreover, historian 
Olivier Zunz has shown that the first generation of salaried corporate managers 
exercised considerable autonomy in creating a new, rationalized work culture and 
bureaucratic organizations. Indeed, Zunz argues that, for some middle managers 
at least, the early years of building corporations offered wider ranging responsi-
bilities and possibilities than ownership of a smaller business would have.26 
Nevertheless, Zunz agrees with turn-of-the-century critics that such manag-
ers did indeed "relinquish individualism."27 Furthermore, the implication of his 
argument is that managerial autonomy diminished with the passing of the first 
generation of managers, and the much larger and ever growing group of white-
collar clerks never exercised such autonomy.28 Finally, no one has denied that 
self-employment accounted for a continually decreasing proportion of the work 
force at the turn of the century.29 
Thus, despite the persistence of small business and the relative autonomy 
enjoyed by the first generation of managers, antitrust agitators had material 
foundations for their claims. They had reason to believe that "bigness" was the 
inevitable trend if businesses were allowed to go their own way without govern-
ment intervention. They were right to think that increasing numbers of American 
men would find employment only as the employees of someone else and that most 
such men would have less freedom of action than they would have had in their 
own enterprises. 
Trustbusters continually lamented the demotion from independence to 
dependence that they believed was increasingly the fate of these men. As one 
commentator put it: "The middle class is becoming a salaried class and rapidly 
losing the economic and moral independence of former days."30 In his condem-
nation of what he called the Tobacco Trust, the muckraker Charles Edward 
Russell wrote: "On a certain stretch of Broadway where ten years ago were thirty-
six independent cigar stores are now but six; and the former proprietors of the 
other thirty are either salesmen for the Trust, servitors, dependent for their bread 
upon whim, fancy, and caprice . . . or they have sought other work; or they have 
died."31 
That this loss of independence constituted a loss of manliness in the eyes of 
many turn-of-the-century commentators is further supported by the classic anti-
trust work, The History of the Standard Oil Company. In this analysis, Ida Tarbell 
narrated the struggles of Midwestern oil refiners and producers to remain 
independent in the face of unfair business practices by John Rockefeller during 
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the late nineteenth century. So, as long as those valiant businessmen fought 
against Rockefeller's attempts to reduce them to "industrial dependents," they in 
her words "struggled manfully."32 
Tarbell's contemporary, Samuel Gompers, had much to say about manful 
struggle as well, but while Tarbell saw such struggle among small businessmen, 
Gompers located it in workingmen's determination to unionize in the face of 
corporate hostility. For example, in response to U.S. Steel's attempt to crush 
workers ' organizations in 1910, Gompers reported that the men ' 'did resist and are 
resisting manfully, grandly, heroically."33 
Although Gompers and his American Federation of Labor urged the break-
up of U.S. Steel, they were not wholesale trustbusters. They rather accepted large 
corporations as a permanent part of the American economy, advocating demoli-
tion only of corporations bent on destroying workers' collective efforts to affect 
working conditions and compensation. Given the expectation of wage-earning 
among these men, one might expect that they viewed themselves as "industrial 
dependents" and rested their manhood on some other foundation. This was not 
so. Workingmen in the AFL defined "independence" in a different way from 
middle-class men, and they continued to see this form of independence as crucial 
to their manly identities. 
For organized labor in the early twentieth century, "independence" referred 
to a workers' ability to unite with other workers to gain some control over their 
working lives. One labor journalist wrote: "The methods of the trade unionists of 
America . . . free labor from a slavish dependence either upon the unstable 
philanthropy or the contemptuous labor trafficking which are features of today's 
multi-millionaires."34 Another insisted that the goal of unionization was "to 
improve the standard of life, to uproot ignorance and foster education, to instill 
character, manhood, and independent spirit among our people. . . ." "If the 
workers are to be deprived of their opportunities for self-improvement and 
independence;" this last writer continued, "if they are to be held at the will of the 
employer... the industrial condition of our country would sink lower than that 
of slavery."35 
Anti-union trusts, then, threatened workingmen's independence as well as 
that of middle-class men, and working-class men connected their manly identities 
with this independence. Gompers, for instance, argued that corporate attempts to 
break unions constituted an "effort to curb and crush American manhood and its 
spirit of sovereignty and independence."36 Speaking of U.S. Steel, the AFL leader 
said, "The gigantic trust. . . has used and is using its great wealth and power in 
an effort to rob the toilers, not only of their livelihood, but of their rights of 
American manhood...." He believed that the only hope for limiting the trusts' 
influence over American life lay in the "virile power" of organized labor. Finally, 
workers striking U.S. Steel needed support from fellow workers "to maintain 
themselves, their wives, and little ones . . . so that their independence, character, 
and American conception of manhood may be sustained... ,"37 
In the 1912 presidential election, Gompers supported Woodrow Wilson, 
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who agreed that trusts underminded American manhood. During the campaign, 
Wilson exaggerated the earlier analogy between a salaried man and a servant, 
invoking instead the metaphor of master and slave. Wilson represented his most 
powerful opponent's plan to regulate big business as a consummation of the 
partnership between monopolies and the federal government, which would 
create, in Wilson's words, "a master." "I don't care how benevolent the master 
is going to be," Wilson warned, "I will not live under a master. That is not what 
America was created for Benevolence never developed a man or a nation."38 
Wilson's words and those of other trustbusters embodied the belief that 
economic independence—defined differently by middle-and working-class men— 
had been the foundation of American manhood. Acceptance of large corporations 
and government regulation, they thought, threatened that independence. Indeed, 
some Americans—perhaps the majority in 1912—could not imagine manliness 
without independence. 
NONCOMBATANTS 
As Wilson's analogy between a salaried man and a slave suggests, the 
manhood at issue in battles between trustbusters and their opponents was 
specifically white manhood. This was evidenced further by the fact that black 
Progressives rarely participated in the debate. For instance, the Crisis, journal-
istic organ of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
and voice of many black progressives, did not devote one single article or editorial 
to government policy toward big business from 1911-1913, years when policy 
toward corporations was hotly debated in the white-dominated press. Indeed, 
only one column mentioned trusts at all, and it was a brief article on a black 
community in Alabama that was built on land somehow ceded by the state 
legislature to an interstate power company. The community was going to court 
to protest.39 
Other sources, too, reveal the unimportance of the trust issue among black 
men. When the National Baptist Convention endorsed William Howard Taft for 
president in 1912, the body published its reasons for supporting the incumbent in 
a presidential contest especially focused on trusts and tariffs: the Convention did 
not mention economic policy at all.40 Articles in the black-run newspaper, The 
Bee, even when they took up the high cost of living—usually a prelude to 
lambasting the trusts in white-dominated publications—never mentioned the 
conglomerates as a probable culprit.41 
Moreover, in one of his editorials several months after Woodrow Wilson 
took office in 1913, W.E.B. Du Bois, the country's leading black male progres-
sive, explicitly stated the relative unimportance to black people of the issues that 
had dominated the campaign of 1912, among them the issues connected with big 
business. "Of course, the real trouble is," he insisted, "that President Wilson... 
may continue to think that the Tariff and Corporate control and China are the only 
pressing questions in National politics." DuBois wanted to set the record straight: 
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"The Crisis is here to emphasize the fact that Lynching, Disfranchisement, 
Peonage and Discrimination in Civil Rights are just as large and in many respects 
larger questions... ,"42 
Indeed, it was precisely in these abrogations of civil and political rights that 
black men saw assaults on their manhood. In Mississippi, for instance, black 
leaders called disfranchisement a "policy of crushing out the manhood of the 
Negro citizen."43 In an early issue of the Crisis, Du Bois resolved "to be satisfied 
with no treatment which ignores my manhood," which required him "to be ready 
at all times and in all places to bear witness with pen, voice, money and deed 
against the . . . wrong of disfranchisement... Z'44 Reverend I.N. Ross, pastor of 
the Metropolitan A.M.E. Church in Washington, D.C., insisted "The man who 
asks me or my people to vote the Democratic ticket [in 1912] . . . places a low 
estimate upon the manhood of a people who have been sold in bondage by the 
sponsors of Democracy. . . ." "As long as the jim-crow car, disfranchisement, 
lynching, and segregation remain as the ruling principle of the Democratic party," 
Ross wrote, "it is absolutely impossible for any self-respecting Negro to vote for 
its candidates."45 
Historian Neil McMillan has shown that the modifications that Southern 
whites forced on race relations in the 1890s also required a return to rigid rituals 
of social deference from black people toward whites.46 This, too, black men 
experienced as an attack on their manhood. Du Bois insisted that "playing the 
man" included a resolve "to stand straight, look the world squarely in the eye, and 
walk to my work with no shuffle or slouch... to refuse to cringe in body or in soul, 
to resent deliberate insult, and assert my just rights in the face of wanton 
aggression."47 Richard Wright would later call the requirement of deference the 
denial of "manly self-assertion on the part of the Negro."48 A Mississippi mother 
discouraged her Northern-educated son from returning to his home state, arguing 
that the deference required of him "would make him much less than the man we 
would have him be."49 
Black men, then, at the turn-of-the-century, did not see huge corporations as 
the threat to their manliness that some white men did. This was not only because 
of fiercier assaults from elsewhere (as outlined above) but also because black men 
were not swept up in the corporate mergers of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to the degree that white men were. The overwhelming 
number of black men continued to live in rural communities in the South, and 
many continued to strive for the kind of independence that a family farm might 
provide.50 Racial discrimination prevented black men from finding employment 
among the ranks of managers in ever-growing, white-dominated corporations, 
and especially before World War I, African-American men even had trouble 
getting employment as waged workers in many industries.51 
The popularity of the economic self-help movement among African Ameri-
cans opens another window on issues of black manhood. It suggests first of all 
just how unaffected by corporate mergers African Americans were: Booker T. 
Washington and his colleagues were not preaching a return to or preservation of 
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individual proprietorships but the initial development of small business enter-
prises serving local African American communities. Second, the goal of the 
National Negro Business League and similar organizations was the achievement 
of the same economic independence cherished by white trustbusters, and some 
black commentators explicitly connected this independence to black manhood. 
R.L. Smith, for instance, founder of the Farmers' Improvement Society of Texas, 
believed his organization would "bring about a self-reliant manhood. . . ,"52 
But, finally, for African American men, building a small business or buying 
a farm was not made difficult by competition from larger businesses. It was made 
difficult by racist financial institutions and lending practices; by wages so low and 
sharecropping so unlucrative that saving for the creation of a business was nearly 
impossible; by racist white consumers who often refused to purchase goods or 
services from black businessmen; and by the poverty of black communities, 
which could not support many entrepreneurs. Thus, although Washington's 
gospel of self-help promoted an understanding of manhood similar to that 
advocated by white trustbusters, the very different relations of black and white 
men to corporate combinations meant that this shared notion of manhood did not 
bring black and white men together in the movement against the trusts.53 
Just as black men showed little concern over the trusts so American women, 
black and white, mostly ignored this "problem." While the debate between 
busters and regulators raged in such periodicals as the Independent, Nation, 
Outlook, and Harper's Weekly as well as in academic social science journals, 
women's magazines virtually ignored the issue. Among the 246 articles that the 
Readers ' Guide to Periodical Literature listed under the topic of trusts between 
1910 and 1914, only 2 appeared in women's magazines, both published in The 
Ladies Home Journal, and both of them condescending to women and written by 
men.54 In fact, of the 72 articles written by authors whose gender is known, all 
were written by men. This includes the many articles that appeared in social 
science periodicals where women were debating other issues of the day but 
remained silent on the issue of the trusts. Even the Woman's Journal, a more 
politically engaged women's periodical than those indexed in the Readers' 
Guide, did not in the years between 1905-1908 or 1911-13 take up the issue of 
corporate control.55 Indeed, the only woman who wrote substantially about the 
trusts was Ida Tarbell, whose exposes on Standard Oil early in the century made 
her a name as a muckraking journalist.56 
The problem of trusts also did not show up on the agenda of organized 
women. One place where progressive black women gathered regularly was in the 
national conventions of the National Association of Colored Women. Organized 
in 1896 and growing throughout the Progressive era, the NACW studied and took 
action on lynching, jim crow, women's suffrage, juvenile justice, and many other 
issues of the day. But again, while the white-dominated press was vigorously 
debating government policy toward corporations, the issue never appeared on a 
national program of the NACW from 1896 through 1918.57 Neither did the issue 
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of corporate combinations appear on a program of the General Federation of 
Women's Clubs in this period despite the participation of those clubs in numerous 
other progressive causes.58 
In fact, progressive women routinely discussed many other economic/ 
industrial issues, including some that were raised by the emergence of giant 
corporations. In civic organizations, white women wrestled with municipal 
ownership of utilities, urban transportation systems, homework, and factory 
inspection.59 Moreover, although women's magazines almost never touched the 
general issue of government policy toward big business, they did report on and 
educate their readers as to the effects of specific governmental regulations on 
women's lives as consumers and domestic managers.60 These articles and 
discussions made the lack of interest in trusts all the more meaningful. 
Occasionally, women campaigning for the Progressive party in 1912 men-
tioned the problem of large corporations. In a meeting of progressives in October 
1912, for instance, Jane Addams insisted "we must have concentration in our 
industries just as we have concentration in our cities. We need control of business, 
however, and that is what the Progressive Party is seeking."61 Another activist, 
Kate Robinson from Tennessee, listed ten reasons that she was a Progressive 
party member and included "the Progressives are the only body of men and 
women who understand what to do with 'the trust.'"62 
Such references to big business were the very rare exception, however, even 
among female activists in this political party devoted to regulating big business. 
Its position on the trusts was the tenth out of ten reasons that Kate Robinson was 
a Progressive, and Jane Addams in her speech acknowledged that the issue of 
trusts was "not generally regarded as a woman's subject."63 When women 
organized state level progressive groups that in every other way mirrored the 
organization of the national party, they nevertheless omitted committees on 
trusts.64 
This lack of interest makes sense insofar as the growth of huge corporations 
did not rob women of some previous foundation for womanhood. The kind of 
economic independence offered to American men in the nineteenth century had 
never been generally available to women, and, if anything, the growth of 
corporations opened new opportunities for some white women to achieve greater 
economic independence than before. Employment as secretaries and clerks, 
sometimes accountants and bookkeepers, within corporate enterprises made 
possible a degree of independence from individual male relatives previously rare 
for women, but, because women hardly ever moved into managerial positions or 
sat on boards of directors, they for the most part remained subordinate to men 
within corporate structures themselves.65 Within the context of corporations, 
then, the accepted gender hierarchy remained intact. Moreover, the new job 
possibilities held out for middle-class women by corporate growth did not block 
them from earlier gender identities as seemed to be the case for men; it merely 
created new options for those who wanted them. 
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This debate, then, sometimes represented as the vital center of Progressiv-
ism, was very race- and gender-specific. 
PROPONENTS OF B I G BUSINESS 
In opposition to trustbusters, a range of white men believed that big 
businesses were best for America: laissez-faire Republicans, socialists, and those 
progressive reformers who supported governmental regulation of business. All 
of these advocates had to respond to accusations that huge corporate combina-
tions destroyed American manhood. I read these responses as evidence that the 
trustbusting debate was indeed in part about the meaning of white manhood and 
offer some examples of those responses here. 
Some advocates of big business simply asserted that competition remained 
so important within corporate life that independent thought and action—suppos-
edly elements of nineteenth-century manhood—continued to be fostered there. 
One writer for Harper's Weekly, noted that "the great indictment" against the 
corporations "has been that in the development of so huge a machine the value of 
the individual has been lost, his personal qualifications as well as his identity 
merged in the mass, opportunity for distinction and field for personal accomplish-
ment abolished."66 In response to that indictment, Harper's surveyed the largest 
American industries and not surprisingly found that corporate executives in-
sisted: "Individuality counts for more to-day than ever before."67 The same claim 
was made by James Dill, a corporate lawyer, who, at the commencement 
ceremonies of Williams College in 1900, responded to fears that college men 
would not enjoy the same opportunities as their fathers: "Individualism is not 
dead."68 
But in both cases, speakers for corporate enterprise were on the defensive, 
trying to convince their audiences that the manly qualities admired in the 
nineteenth century would continue to be rewarded in an entirely new economic 
context. Nevertheless, everything that these apologists described about life in a 
large corporation suggested that only a very few men could be rewarded by 
advancement to creative levels of authority and that the primary goal of all men 
in a corporation was to learn the system already in place and dutifully follow the 
routines established for efficient operation of their departments. Nothing that 
these advocates described confirmed their conclusion that individualism or 
independence were qualities generally nurtured by large corporate concerns.69 
Less defensive were those who named alternative sources for American 
manhood. For example, Rev. Henry A. Stimson, argued in 1901 that "there has 
been no more important agency for the production of character than the respon-
sibility of managing an individual business." Consequently, it was frightening 
that "individual business is disappearing." He went on to say that corporations 
could not, however, hope to survive "with men in whom manhood in its finer 
forms is not both stimulated and rewarded." The only institution left, Stimson 
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argued, that could create "that type of manhood" was the church.70 Unlike those 
who simply asserted without evidence that an earlier form of manhood would 
continue to be created by the new corporations, Stimson believed that they could 
not. But, rather than taking this to mean that the corporations must be destroyed, 
he identified the church as an alternative source of traditional manly qualities. 
A completely different kind of case for big business—under government 
regulation and possibly government ownership—was made by the socialist and 
naturalist Jack London. London turned on its head the assumption that individual 
enterprise allowed men to be free while salaried employees were forced to be yes-
men to their superiors. London argued that the "nineteenth century business man 
. . . is the slave of his desk, the genie of the dollar." Because every man has, in a 
competitive economic system, to worry about nothing else except making a 
living, "individuality is repressed, forced to manifest itself in acquisitiveness and 
selfishness." London argued that there "should be no one type of man." But, a 
competitive economy created only one sort of man—"from the factory hand to the 
millionaire there will be the one stamp of material acquisitiveness." Only after 
Americans achieved the wealth and security promised by big business operating 
under government regulation could varieties of men, that is, true individuality, 
flourish.71 
London not only shrewdly re-envisioned competition among individual 
enterprises as the creator of slaves but he also articulated the belief that manhood 
was created not inborn. In one section of his essay, he argued, for instance, that 
Renaissance Spain "had lost the greater part of the variety which was hers in 
former times." This was, he insisted, not "due to an innate degeneracy of her 
people, but to her social, political and religious structures." His closing line was: 
"government should make men by giving them the freedom to make them-
selves."72 
London was not the only regulator who believed it possible deliberately to 
build a new kind of manhood. Another supporter of governmental regulation 
explicitly stated the same belief in the plasticity of identity: "We cannot change 
human nature? Oh, yes, we can." He argued that the institutions that could change 
men's nature were legislatures, churches, homes, and schools, all of which could 
"give to ambition and to acquisitiveness a new meaning and a new direction."73 
Interestingly, this social critic argued that some big businesses were good and that 
the distinguishing feature of good businesses was that they "received their 
fortunes in return for the service which they have rendered to the community." He 
was trying to define good businessmen as servants of the community: "The 
ambition for service is the merchant's ambition." Bad businessmen were rather 
"gamblers" filled only with the "ambition for gain." Legislation, he suggested, 
could send to jail those whose only goal was private gain and could reward those 
whose goal was service to the community. In contrast to Woodrow Wilson or the 
Independent, this writer construed servanthood as a worthy position for American 
men. But his form of servanthood was voluntary and rendered to a community 
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of peers rather than involuntary and rendered to superiors within a corporate 
hierarchy.74 
The most popular proponent of big business under governmental regulation 
was eventually Theodore Roosevelt. By 1912, when he was the presidential 
candidate of the Progressive party, Roosevelt became the spokesperson for 
federal regulation of big business rather than trustbusting, which he left to his 
major opponent, Woodrow Wilson. I believe that Roosevelt could with political 
impunity accept enormous corporations precisely because he offered clear 
alternative bases for American manhood to the basis of economic self-suffi-
ciency. Indeed, when Woodrow Wilson compared the relationship between a 
monopoly-regulating government and American men to the master/slave rela-
tionship, he was on to something important in Roosevelt's scheme: Roosevelt's 
new foundations for American manhood in many ways recalled those of white 
antebellum Southern manhood. White manhood in the antebellum South had 
rested more on violence, honor, and control of other people than had the manhood 
of the North.75 
In Roosevelt's scheme, well-known through recent historical analyses, a 
new white manhood would rest especially on three pillars: violence—played out 
on football fields, battlefields, and in boxing rings; on honor, about which he 
railed incessantly in his discussions of foreign policy; and on ruling races he 
considered inferior, a stand that had won the day in America's decision to rule the 
Philippines rather than to grant it independence.76 
Every student of American history is familiar with Roosevelt's 
rambunctiousness, safaris, and love of the West. We know that the twenty-sixth 
president cheered for college football, boxed, rode, roped, camped, hunted and 
cherished the company of men who met those challenges more gracefully than he. 
Rough sports, in fact, Roosevelt offered as one of the foundations of American 
manhood.77 
We also know Roosevelt as a proponent of a new American militarism and 
imperialism. In Roosevelt's mind, these initiatives provided further foundations 
for American manhood. Beginning in the late 1890s, in fact, he questioned the 
manliness of those who did not support a naval build-up and who argued against 
the United States's rule of the Philippines. In "The Strenuous Life," his famous 
speech before a Chicago men's club in 1899, he insisted: "We do not admire the 
man of timid peace. We admire the man who embodies victorious effort;... who 
has those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life."78 He 
went on to argue that Americans must accept the new responsibilities incurred 
through victory in the Spanish-American War. With regard to the Philippines in 
particular, he argued that the United States must not allow the islands to rule 
themselves but rather must govern them. Otherwise, Roosevelt warned, "Some 
stronger, manlier power would have to step in and do the work, and we would have 
shown ourselves weaklings. . . ."79 Later in his speech, he reiterated that if the 
United States shirked governing the Philippines, then that rule would be instituted 
"by some stronger and more manful race."80 
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Finally, Roosevelt waved away the concerns of those who believed it 
undemocratic for the United States to engage in imperial rule. He expressed only 
contempt for those "who cant about 'liberty' and the 'consent of the governed,' 
in order to excuse themselves for their unwillingness to play the part of men."81 
For Roosevelt, real men ruled other men, especially men of races he 
considered inferior. The racial component of his definition of manhood was clear 
in his Chicago speech. There, he reasoned that those who worried about extending 
liberty and consent of the governed to Filipinos, "would make it incumbent on us 
to leave the Apaches of Arizona to work out their own salvation, and to decline 
to interfere in a single Indian reservation."82 In another memorable passage, 
Roosevelt cautioned his audience that if they did not accept the responsibilities 
of imperial rule, then they could expect "to play the part of China, and be content 
to rot by inches in ignoble ease within our borders " The United States could 
then expect to discover in itself "what China has already found," which was that 
it had "lost the manly and adventurous qualities."83 
These were themes that Theodore Roosevelt would play out routinely until 
his death: American manhood required participation in rough sports, outdoor life, 
military adventures, and imperial rule.84 This combination of themes often went 
together among white progressive men who believed that the big corporations 
were here to stay. Albert Shaw, for instance, in a series of college commencement 
speeches delivered in the early twentieth century, insisted that capitalistic 
combinations were permanent and that, as a result, the U.S. was heading into a 
new, more "cooperative age." 
Shaw identified the problem posed for middle-class American men as others 
had: "we have been so gravely and so incessantly warned about the crushing out 
of opportunities for young men through the growth of capitalistic combinations, 
that many of us find it hard to believe that we are not in some danger of being 
folded, stifled, and crushed within the tentacles of the octopus."85 He admitted 
that, if he had his druthers, he would prefer the older option of going into business 
or a profession in a small town where men of the nineteenth century had to "elbow 
their way to the front in law practice and in politics as persons of at least local 
importance."86 But, he insisted, those days were over: "a greatly increased 
proportion of young men must expect to work on salaries in large organiza-
tions."87 The conditions of America's "pioneering period," which created "a 
wonderful spirit of individuality, independence, and self-direction in the average 
man," were gone. They had "ended with the Spanish War."88 And now, America 
was in transition to "the intelligent, cooperative man of the future, as against the 
competitive man of the past."89 It was a manhood that, according to Shaw, would 
flourish not only within big corporations, but also in the military and among rulers 
of colonies. In his speeches to graduating college men, Shaw advocated a big 
navy and America's rule of the Philippines.90 
Critics of this new manhood agreed on its origins. In one scathing and 
satirical article titled "The Military Idea of Manliness," Ernest Howard Crosby— 
poet, reformer, and muckraker—explained: "As a nation of mere tradesmen and 
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farmers we have never assimilated the ideals of honor, manliness and glory which 
distinguish the military peoples." Those ideals, he insisted, included picking on 
people weaker than oneself, a practice embodied in all of mihtaiy/imperial life 
from hazing at West Point to the habit of imperial powers to move against the 
weakest states rather than against each other. Furthermore, he argued, this 
military/imperial manhood required "[ajbsolute obedience, readiness to obey 
orders. . . ." These Crosby insisted, "are necessary military qualities." They 
composed "the new manliness," belief in which required that American men say 
good-bye "to the ancient belief in freedom and independence which prevailed 
before the recent repeal of the Declaration [embodied in the decision to rule the 
Philippines]."91 
Crosby thus castigated those who supported a Rooseveltian attempt to set 
American manhood on a new footing that ordered men within a hierarchy where 
the strong seemed to prey on the weak and the higher ups demanded deference. 
To some turn-of-the-century observers, that was precisely what corporate and 
military life shared: an acceptance of men as dependents within a hierarchy in 
which only a few could move up and the rest must be satisfied to learn the rules 
and obey them. They construed this as an enormous shift from nineteenth-century 
manhood, resting as it had on independence of thought and action. 
Roosevelt's laying out alternatives to Victorian manhood made it possible 
for him to achieve tremendous popularity while supporting governmental regu-
lation of big business. In fact, William Allen White, a renowned Progressive, also 
understood the centrality of manliness in the election of 1912. In a letter to losing 
presidential candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, the Kansas newspaperman ex-
plained that many of Roosevelt's votes were "votes of men who had confidence 
in you personally without having any particular intelligent reason to give why; 
except that you were a masculine sort of a person with extremely masculine 
virtues and palpably masculine faults for which they loved you."92 
CONCLUSION 
This essay has argued that race-specific gender structured the trustbusting 
debate in two ways. First, it identified who participated in the debate. Sometimes 
represented as the crux of Progressivism, the battle over big business was largely 
confined to the community of white men. While such issues as women's suffrage 
and juvenile justice animated discussions among men and women, black and 
white, the issue of trusts was overwhelmingly a white man's issue. In view of this, 
we need to find a way to represent it in textbooks and other general considerations 
of the early twentieth century as the sharply race- and gender-specific issue that 
it was. Otherwise, we misunderstand Progressivism by misidentifying its central 
themes and causes, and we obscure the experience of African Americans and 
women by presenting the concerns of white men as those of reformers as a whole. 
Another aspect of Progressivism revealed in the trustbusting debate was the 
belief that manhood and womanhood were created rather than natural. Some 
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turn-of-the-century commentators believed that historically changing institu-
tions and beliefs imbued men and women with the particular qualities associated 
with each sex in a given era. If, therefore, they wanted to create particular kinds 
of women and men, they believed they had to build particular kinds of institutions 
and popularize particular beliefs. These writers assumed that politics and public 
policy touched areas so intimate as personal identity: in the battle over the trusts, 
they self-consciously struggled over the form that white manhood should take in 
the twentieth century. 
And this was the second way in which gender structured the debate over 
trusts: the controversy was in part about the form that white American manhood 
would take in the twentieth century. Gender, in this case, the meaning of white 
manhood, wove through arguments about the appropriate response to corporate 
capitalism at the turn of the century. Many Americans believed that the decision 
to break up the trusts or to regulate them had implications for the form that white 
American manhood would take in the decades to come, and they sometimes 
formed their arguments for busting or regulating explicitly in terms of the effect 
on manliness. Thus, we have come to see another previously unrecognized 
element of the trustbusting debate. 
According to many middle-class thinkers at the turn of the century, American 
manhood had, during the nineteenth century, rested in large part on the indepen-
dence presumably afforded a man by owning his own farm, business, or 
professional practice. American men's citizenship was premised on precisely 
that independence, which was supposed to give each man the freedom to vote his 
own mind. The emergence of corporate capitalism seemed to these commentators 
to mean that increasing percentages of American men would never achieve the 
requisite independence. They would instead spend all of the their working lives 
as employees of someone else—as workers, managers, or salesmen for large 
corporations. Trustbusting seemed to recuperate the possibility of a nineteenth-
century form of economic self-sufficiency while regulation seemed to surrender 
that foundation of manhood. 
Unlike middle-class trustbusters, working-class white men did not look 
nostalgically to the nineteenth century for their ideal of independent manhood. 
Leaders of organized labor redefined independence to mean the ability of male 
workers to unite and through unity to gain some control over the conditions of 
their labor and levels of compensation. Though different from the middle-class 
version, this notion of independence was very much tied to manhood for 
commentators of the working class, and they, too, saw some trusts as a threat to 
their independence and thus to American manhood. 
The debate over trusts was in part, then, a debate between those who 
welcomed the "cooperative man of the future" and those who championed "the 
competitive man of the past." But "cooperative man" took more than one form in 
the imaginations of these debaters. In the minds of some, the American manhood 
implicitly promoted by corporate combinations regulated by governmental 
agencies was economically dependent insofar as he was not his own boss but an 
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employee; not an autonomous decision-maker but one of many woven into 
decision-making bodies, be they boards of directors, governmental commissions, 
or committees of managers; embedded in various hierarchies within individual 
companies, within larger corporate structures, and between business and govern-
ment. At his best, "the cooperative man of the future" was an unselfish and 
competent team player satisfied to play his small part in the economic life of the 
country; at his worst, he was a bureaucratic drudge.93 
For other thinkers, however, big business—if regulated—promised in-
creased wealth and comfort for everyone; it might usher in the day of men truly 
free and devoted to community rather than competition. In the minds of those like 
Jack London, finer kinds of men might finally materialize when men no longer 
had to dedicate all of their energies to brute survival in a cut-throat economic 
system. Genuine equality, democracy, and individuality might be the result of 
increased economic cooperation. 
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